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I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent Texas appellate court decisions, the courts were faced
with the problem of deciding whether a testator meant to include, or at
least did not intend to exclude, adopted children in a testamentary class
gift.' Often a testator will make a bequest or declare the beneficiary of a
trust to be not just one individual, but a group of persons. A will may
declare that property is bequeathed to the testator's brothers and sisters
or to her children. The question becomes: May an adopted sibling or
child share in such a gift? Courts across the United States have struggled
with this issue in recent years, and an increasing number are holding that
gifts to children, issue, or lineal descendants do not necessarily exclude
adopted children. However, in both Texas cases, the courts held that the
adopted children could not take as members of the class.2 The purpose
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas; LL.M. (1987), J.D. (1981), B.S. (1978), University of Illinois, Urbana -Champaign.
1. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ); Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
2. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
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of this article is to illustrate that this result is contrary to both the mod-
em trend of court decisions nationwide and the prevailing public policy
regarding adoption, particularly as exemplified by state adoption
statutes.
II. THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION LAW
A. Generally
Adoption was recognized in ancient civilizations, most notably in
Rome. Under Roman civil law, an adoptee was completely integrated
into the adopting family for all purposes, including inheritance.3 Adop-
tion served two important functions. First, the adopted child carried out
the sacred familial religious rites. Second, the adoptee preserved the
family name and property for posterity. 4 In contrast, the common-law
system did not treat adoption as an important legal institution. The Eng-
lish common law placed great emphasis on bloodlines for purposes of
inheritance. As a result, England did not recognize adoption in its com-
mon law,5 and did not formally legitimize adoption by statute until
1926.6 In 1846, Mississippi became the first American state to enact a
statute permitting adoption.7 Texas and Louisiana, states with a civil-
law tradition, also recognized adoption during the mid-nineteenth
century.8
Adoption laws became widespread in this country because of a so-
cial welfare interest in homeless and dependent children, not because of
no writ) (clear intent to share only with relatives of the whole blood); Diemer v. Diemer, 717
S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (only blood rela-
tives included in class).
3. See Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744-45
(1956). For additional information on the history of adoption, see Kuhlmann, Intestate Suc-
cession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Presser, The Historical
Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1972).
4. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989); Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1956).
5. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989); Kuhlmann, Intestate
Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 222 (1943); Comment,
Adopted Children in Pennsylvania: A Class Without A Clause, 17 VILL. L. REV. 1066, 1067
(1972).
6. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q.
221, 222 (1943) (discussing the Adoption Act, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29 § 5(2) (1926)).
7. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 n.1 (1989). The statute, '1846
Miss. Laws, ch. 60, gave courts the power to make any person the heir of the petitioner.
8. See Law of Jan. 16, 1850, ch. 39, § 1, 1850 Tex. Gen. Laws 36,3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 474 (1898); Fuselier v. Masse, 4 La. 423 (1832). See also Comment, Adopted Chil-
dren in Pennsylvania: A Class Without A Clause, 17 VILL. L. REV. 1066, 1068 (1972); 7 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989).
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concerns with heirship or family survival.9 Prior to the 1850s, orphaned
or neglected children were cared for through the English system of put-
ting out, which involved placing the child with another family, usually a
relative, or through apprenticeship or indenture systems." The indus-
trial revolution and the large influx of immigrants during the mid- to
late-nineteenth century led to increased urban poverty, an increasing
number of destitute children, and the economic exploitation of these
children. '
At the same time that these economic and social forces were strain-
ing the existing child welfare system, a Christian reform movement be-
gan. Philanthropists worked to place dependent children in family
homes rather than in institutions. 2 Many families later sought to le-
gally recognize their new members, and placed pressure on state legisla-
tures to enact adoption statutes.13  Massachusetts was the first state to
adopt a general adoption act in 1851.14 As a result of the historical de-
velopment of American adoption law, the primary concern of the mod-
ern law is the welfare of the adopted child. 5  In addition, under
American law, an adoption is intended to sever any ties which may still
exist with the natural family and to transplant or assimilate the adoptee
into a new family.' 6 Why, then, should an adopted child be excluded
from sharing a class gift?
B. Adopted Children and Class Gifts
The answer lies, in part, in the stranger to the adoption rule. This
rule of will construction is used when a testator's intent is unstated or
unclear, and creates a rebuttable presumption that adopted children are
excluded from participation in class gifts. 7 The rule does not apply
when the testator herself is the adopting parent, since the testator would
9. See 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989); Kuhlmann, Intes-
tate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 223-24 (1943).
10. Rein, Relatives By Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 715 (1984).
11. Id. at 716.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11
J. FAM. L. 443, 488-89 (1972).
14. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L.
443, 465 (1972).
15. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why,
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1984).
16. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989).
17. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why,
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984).
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presumably include her own adopted children in a class gift. 8 Thus the
rule applies only to third-party donors, or strangers to the adoption. The
roots of this rule lie in the English common law tradition, with its con-
cern for blood relationships. 9 It is important to note, however, that even
in states embracing the stranger to the adoption rule, it is merely a rule of
construction, and will not prevail over an expressed intent to include the
adopted children of the testator.2°
Courts have also established other exceptions. For example, if the
donor knew of the adoption and the adoption antedated execution of the
will or other instrument creating the class gift, then adopted members of
the class would be included.21 If a parent could not have natural-born
children, and this fact was known to the testator, the adopted children
would be included.22 Other courts, including those in Texas, appear to
draw a distinction between class gifts to children and class gifts to bodily
heirs, issue, or lineal descendants23 by including adopted persons in a
class gift to children, but excluding them when the class is described by a
18. See Halbach, Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L.
REV. 333, 337 (1983); see generally Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who
Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 733 (1984); Comment, Toward Equal
Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testamentary Class Gifts.- Iowa's Rejection of the Stran-
ger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67 IOWA L. REV. 845, 849 (1982). The rule
was first invoked by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in In re Woodcock, 68 A. 821 (Me.
1907).
19. See Kulhmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221, 233-34 (1943); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should
Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 733 (1984); Comment, Toward Equal Treatment
of Adopted Children Under Testamentary Class Gifts. Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the
Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67 IOWA L. REV. 845, 845 (1982). See also the discus-
sion concerning intent in subpart III(B)(1) infra.
20. Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testamentary Class
Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 845, 849 (1982). See also the discussion concerning intent in subpart III(B)(1) infra.
21. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why,
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 733-34 (1984); see Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under
Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 981, 982-83 (1965); see also, Comment, Toward Equal Treatment
of Adopted Children Under Testamentary Class Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the
Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67 IOWA L. REV. 845, 850 n.52 (1982) and accompany-
ing text.
22. Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 971,
984 (1965); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 734 (1984).
23. Compare Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex, Civ. App.-Dallas) (allowing
adopted child to share in conveyance to children), aff'd, 461 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1970) with
Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ) (adopted children did not share in gift to lineal descendants) and Diemer v. Diemer, 717
S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (adopted children
not included in gift to issue). The cases are discussed in more detail in part IV infra,,.'
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term with blood or biological connotations.24 As the next section illus-
trates, although many states are rejecting the stranger to the adoption
rule, adopted children are by no means universally accepted as full fam-
ily members for purposes of class gifts.
III. THE MODERN TREND-STATUTES AND CASES
A. Statutory Law
Adoption law in the United States is primarily a creature of statute,
rather than of common law.25 The intent of modern adoption law is to
make the adopted child part of a new family and to treat the adoptee as a
natural-born child.26 States uniformly permit the adopted child to in-
herit from the adopting parents by intestate succession.27 With some ex-
ceptions, state statutes also permit an adopted child to inherit through
the adopting parents;28 the adoptee may inherit not only from the adopt-
ing parent, but from that parent's relatives as well. These provisions,
however, generally apply only to intestacy situations.
A few states have expressly addressed the problem of including
adopted children in a class gift created by a will or trust. They have
created a statutory presumption reversing the stranger to the adoption
rule. Connecticut, for example, provides that words such as "child," "is-
sue," "heir," "grandchild," or plurals thereof, specifically include
24. See Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 734 (1984); see also Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children
Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 971, 980 (1965). At common law, the words issue or
heirs of the body could operate to create a fee tail, an estate that could only pass to the lineal,
bodily descendants of the original grantee. See J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 47-51 (3d ed. 1989).
25. See 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1004 (1989).
26. See Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221, 248 (1948); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1984).
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(b) (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(2) (1988);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-215(2) (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-211(1) (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.172(1)(c) (West 1985); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-8 (West Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.223(1) (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (Sub. 1) (West 1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 453.090(2) (Vernon 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.160 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-50(b) (West Supp. 1989); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16(a) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(1) (1984 and Supp.
1988); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09(b) (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.02.005(4), 11.04.085 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11(b) (1986); WYo. STAT. § 1-22-
114(b) (1977); see 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1005 (1989).
28. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1005 (1989). For example, Vermont
restricts the adoptee's right to inherit through the adopting parents. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 448 (1974).
1990]
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adopted children unless a contrary intention is indicated.29 Maryland,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas have similar statutes.3"
Some of these statutes have provisions limiting their application to docu-
ments executed after a certain date.31 The North Carolina statute makes
similar provisions applicable retroactively to all instruments. 32 The Lou-
isiana statute specifically includes adoptees as forced heirs of their adop-
tive parents' estates.33 The Vermont statute, on the other hand, expressly
excludes adopted children from a class gift made to heirs of the body.3 4
The vast majority of states, however, have failed to specifically address
the problem of including adopted children in testamentary or inter vivos
class gifts in their statutes, leaving the issue with the courts.
B. Case Law
Courts increasingly are rejecting the stranger to the adoption pre-
sumption, replacing it with a presumption favoring inclusion of the
adoptee in a class gift.35 Many courts, however, hold fast to the tradi-
tional view and the policy arguments advanced by each side are outlined
in this next section.
1. Policy and the Issue of Intent
A key tenet of construction is that a will or trust instrument should
be construed in a manner designed to carry out the grantor's intent.
36
When dealing with an adopted child and a class gift, donors generally do
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-64a(4) (West Supp. 1989).
30. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-308(d) (1984); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§§ 1-205, 1-207 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 8 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 112.195 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16(a) (1988); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09(c)
(Vernon 1986).
31. For example, the Connecticut statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45.64a(10) (West
Supp. 1989), applies to documents executed after October 1, 1959; the Maryland statute, MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-308(d) (1984), applies to those persons adopted after June 1, 1947,
even if the document was executed prior to that date; the Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 8 (West 1987), applies to documents executed after August 26, 1958;
and the Rhode Island statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16(a) (1988), applies to estates that have
vested in persons after April 20, 1962.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23(3) (Supp. 1988).
33. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214 (West Supp. 1989).
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1974).
35. See Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 735 (1984). Halbach indicated a similar trend in his 1965 article.
Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 971, 997-98
(1965).
36. See Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV.
971, 975 (1965); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 732 (1984).
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not address the problem of including an adoptee in the class. The com-
mon law simply presumed that adopted children were not included in a
class gift, other than one from the adopting parents,37 and many courts
still follow this presumption." Other states, conversely, have simply
reversed the presumption and hold that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary a testator did intend to include adopted children in a class
gift.3
9
37. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
38. Some fairly recent cases reaching this conclusion are: Schapira v. Connecticut Bank
& Trust Co., 528 A.2d 367 (Conn. 1987) (adoptive granddaughter not included in trust distri-
bution to issue or next of kin); Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1983) (adopted child
of grantor's granddaughter was not entitled to take a remainder interest as an heir of the
body); Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8 (Me. 1985) (adoptive grandson not included in testamen-
tary gift to descendants or issue); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1986) (adopted
children of settlor's daughter were not entitled to share in trust distribution to heirs of the
body); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. 1988) (children of adopted son of income
beneficiary under testamentary trust did not constitute lineal descendants in order to take
under will); Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
no writ) (adopted children of testator's sister did not take under will as lineal descendants);
Hyman v. Glover, 348 S.E.2d 269 (Va. 1986) (adoptive granddaughter did not take as issue
under will).
39. Modern courts began to reject the stranger to the adoption rule in the 1960s and early
1970s. See Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (adopted child allowed to take under
two different wills as issue of his adoptive mother), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087 (1969); Haskell
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 304 A.2d 53 (Del. 1973) (adopted son of settlor's son could share in
trust proceeds under gift to issue); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mitchell, 251 A.2d 128 (N.J.
1969) (adopted children of testator's daughter could take as descendants under will); In re
Thompson, 250 A.2d 393 (N.J. 1969) (child adopted by testator's daughter after testator's
death could take as issue under will); In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1964) (adopted
children included in bequest to lawful children of will beneficiary); Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d
797 (Pa. 1972) (adoptive grandchildren included in gift to children of testator's son).
In recent years courts have continued to follow this trend. See Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369
So. 2d 798 (Ala. 1979) (adopted children of settlor's nephew may take as descendants); Wielert
v. Larson, 404 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1980) (adopted grandchildren of testator were included in gift
to issue of their body); In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 1985) (adopted child of
testator's son included in gift to issue); In re Estates of Leggett, 378 N.W.2d 467 (Mich. 1985)
(adopted granddaughter included in trust remainder to issue of settlor's daughter), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986); In re Trusts of Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 1977)
(adopted children of settlor's daughter took as issue of the body under trust); In re Estate of
Leonard, 514 A.2d 822 (N.H. 1986) (adopted children of testatrix's son took under testamen-
tary trust as lineal descendants); Hines v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 708 P.2d 1078 (Okla.
1985) (adopted child permitted to take as issue under will).
The Pennsylvania courts have decided several cases on this issue. In addition to Estate of
Tafel, 296 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1972), the leading case cited above, other Pennsylvania cases include:
Estate of Riley, 446 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1982) (adopted children of testator's grandchildren could
take as issue under will); Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1978) (adopted children of testa-
tor's niece could take as issue under will); In re Estate of Ogden, 509 A.2d 1271 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986) (adopted children of settlor's grandniece could take as heirs of the body or children
of the body of trust beneficiary); and In re Estate of Ketcham, 495 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (child adopted as an infant, but not child adopted as an adult, included in gift to issue of
children of testatrix).
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Courts thathave refused to permit adopted children to participate in
a class gift justify this result in a variety of ways. First, some courts still
cling to the notion that there is a natural preference for grantors to leave
property to their own flesh and blood, not to outsiders." This tendency
may be more pronounced when the gift is made to a class defined by
terms with strong bloodline connotations such as heirs of the body, or
issue of the body.4 Other courts do not necessarily assume a preference
for blood relatives, but are reluctant to expand the rights of adopted chil-
dren at the expense of an unrelated grantor. These courts construe the
adoption statutes very strictly, and may be reluctant to overturn prece-
dent in order to include adopted children in a class gift.42
In some cases, the courts might be willing to permit an adopted
child to take under a class gift that was made in a recently executed
document. However, testamentary or trust instruments may have been
executed twenty or more years before the gift in question would vest.
The law at the time of execution of the instrument may have clearly ex-
cluded adopted children from participating in class gifts under the stran-
ger to the adoption rule. This retroactivity problem is discussed in
subpart III(B)(2) of this Article. Finally, courts will often exclude adult
adoptees from participating in class gifts, fearing fraud or abuse of the
adoption process. This is discussed in greater detail below.43
Courts that include adopted children as grantees of a class gift ad-
vance a variety of arguments to support their position. Some courts re-
40. See Halbach, Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L.
REV. 333, 338 (1983); Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testa-
mentary Class Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hid-
dleson, 67 IOWA L. REV. 845, 852-53 (1982).
41. See Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV.
971, 980 (1965); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 734 (1984). See also Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Hills,
254 A.2d 453 (Conn. 1969) (the term descendants connotes relationship by blood in its ordi-
nary meaning); Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1983) (grantor intended to exclude
adopted children by use of the words heirs of her body in conveyance); Poertner v. Burkdoll,
439 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1968) (normal legal concept of issue includes only lineal heirs, not adopted
children); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1986) (use of term heirs of the body in-
tended to exclude adopted children); Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (references to issue in will clearly connotes blood relation-
ship and excludes adopted children).
42. See Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testamentary
Class Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67
IOWA L. REV. 845, 851 (1982). See also Schapira v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 528 A.2d
367 (Conn. 1987) (even though court may agree with principle that stranger to the adoption
rule is outmoded, it is bound by legislative policy indicating a more orderly transition to inclu-
sion of adopted children in class gifts); Poertner v. Burkdoll, 439 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1968) (statu-
tory definition of issue, which includes adoptees, is limited to section on intestate succession).
43. See infra subpart III(B)(3).
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ject the traditional consanguinity concerns, reasoning that a grantor
would, in fact, be likely to intend inclusion of adopted children in the
conveyance." In light of modern law and policy, a family today is more
than simply a set of biological relationships, it is one of psychological and
emotional bonds as well.45
Similarly, many courts justify the inclusion of adopted children in a
gift made under a will or trust as being more consistent with the modern
goals of adoption law. One of these goals is severance of the child from
his former family and union of the child with a new family unit. Inclu-
sion of adoptees in class gifts is also consistent with the intestacy statutes,
which treat adopted children as natural-born children. 6
Some courts use a technical approach, holding that words such as
children, descendants, or issue would normally include all members of
the class, whether adopted or not. According to this view, it would be
easy to exclude adopted children from a class by use of appropriate lan-
guage. As one court has stated, a competent draftsman would not simply
use the word "issue" to exclude adopted children from participating in a
class gift.47
44. In re Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 1985) (presumption that testator
intended to treat adopted children the same); In re Trust of Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163
(Minn. 1977) (presumption that adopted children will inherit); Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Mitchell, 251 A.2d 128 (N.J. 1969) (presumption exists in favor of adopted child); Estate of
Riley, 446 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1982) (testator intends to include adopted children). See Rein, Rela-
tives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV.
711, 734, 738-39 (1984); Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Tes-
tamentary Class Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hid-
dleson, 67 IOWA L. REV. 845, 852 (1982). See also Kales, Rights of Adopted Children, 9 ILL.
L. REV. 149, 164 (1914), which indicates that adopted children could be presumed to share in
class gifts to children or issue as early as 1914.
45. See Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221, 248 (1943) (adopted child today is made full standing member of new family);
Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testamentary Class Gifts:
Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67 IOWA L. REV.
845, 853 (1982) (child is term of origin, not status); see also Estate of Tafel, 296 A.2d 797, 801
(Pa. 1972) (most strangers to an adoption likely to accept relationships established by adoptive
parents).
46. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text; Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption,
and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 806-07 (1984);
Wielert v. Larson, 404 N.E.2d 1111 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (shift in public policy and broadened
definitions); In re Estates of Leggett, 378 N.W.2d 467 (Mich. 1985) (statute provides that issue
includes adopted person), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986); Tootle v. Tootle, 490 N.E.2d 878,
883-84 (Ohio 1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (statute enacted to place adopted children in same
position as natural-born children); Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 799-801 (Utah 1974)
(Crockett, J., dissenting) (discrimination against adopted child is contrary to statutory law and
out of harmony with policy considerations).
47. Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087
(1969). See also In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571, 577 (N.J. 1964) ("[A) competent draftsman
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A few courts have held that facts and circumstances, found either
within the donative document or outside of it, may determine whether
the adopted children should be permitted to take under a class gift. In a
New York case,4" a trust agreement permitted each donee to appoint his
share to anyone he chose, and in default of such appointment, the share
would go to the donee's issue then living. Furthermore, if a donee died,
either without exercising the power of appointment or without issue,
then the share would go to the donee's spouse who, of course, would be
unrelated by blood to the settlor of the trust.49 The court of appeals held
that adopted children were not excluded under this trust, since any per-
son, including those unrelated to the settlor by blood, could share in the
proceeds of the trust.5" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has enumer-
ated four factors to be considered in determining the intent of a grantor:
1) the words of the instrument; 2) the scheme of distribution; 3) the cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the will; and 4) any other facts
bearing on the question.5" However, cases from other states show that
reliance on extrinsic facts and circumstances may lead to conflict con-
cerning the donor's actual intent.5 2
A final policy argument in favor of nondiscrimination against
adopted children is a historical one. In ancient times, the only purpose of
adoption was to continue the family line,53 and the argument has been
made that our modern legal analysis should not ignore this historically
would not deliberately pick a word which instead of controlling the context is easily colored by
it."); Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 971, 980
(1965) ("The draftsman is not likely to choose his language with an objective of producing a
particular result with respect to this type of question, for if his attention were directed to this
matter at the stage of drafting the question would not have been left unanswered.").
48. In re Banker's Trust Co., 291 N.E.2d 137 (N.Y. 1972).
49. Id. at 138.
50. Id. at 140-41.
51. Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d 920, 921 (Pa. 1978). The court found that the testator did
not intend to exclude adopted children from a gift to his niece's issue, despite the fact he
limited her power of appointment to blood relatives in the same document.
52. In In re Estate of Leonard, 514 A.2d 822 (N.H. 1986), the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found that the testatrix did not intend to exclude her son's adopted children from a gift
to lineal descendants, despite the fact that she referred specifically to these children by name
and as her grandchildren elsewhere in the document.
The dissent in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mitchell, 251 A.2d 128, 130-31 (N.J. 1969)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting), argued that since extrinsic evidence tended to show that the testator
was obsessed with his own bloodline, his daughter's adopted children should not be included in
a gift to descendants. This justice referred to a book written by the testator which contained
several references to bloodlines. The majority held that the testator's intent was not clear and
that the adopted children could participate in the class gift. Id. at 129. Estate of Sykes, 383
A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1978) (facts and circumstances do not jutsify a particular view).
53. See supra notes 3-16 and accompanying text.
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significant fact.54
2. The Retroactivity Problem
In determining the likely intent of a class gift donor, courts will
often focus on the exact timing of events. The courts will look at when
the will or trust instrument was drafted, when any statutes affecting the
rights of adopted children were passed, and when the class gift takes ef-
fect." For example, assume a donor executes a will or a trust containing
a class gift in 1940. Children who could become members of the class are
adopted in 1950. The donor dies in 1960, and the class gift does not vest
until 1970. What law, statute, or presumption should govern the inclu-
sion of adoptees as members of the class? Should it be the law in effect at
the time of the execution of the instrument, the time of the donor's death,
or at the time the gift would actually vest in the class members?
The courts are split on this issue.5 6 Some take a very traditional
view, reasoning that a grantor is presumed to know the law and therefore
must intend that the law in effect at the time of the execution of the
instrument, or the law in effect at the death of the grantor in the case of a
will, should be applied.5 7 This interpretation tends to exclude adopted
children from participating in such class gifts.58
Other courts have reasoned that modern public policy should pre-
vail, holding the law in effect at the time the class gift becomes effective is
the proper law to apply.59 This tends to permit adopted children to take
54. See Comment, Toward Equal Treatment of Adopted Children Under Testamentary
Class Gifts: Iowa's Rejection of the Stranger to the Adoption Rule in Elliott v. Hiddleson, 67
IOWA L. REV. 845, 852 n.63 (1982).
55. See Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 737 (1984).
56. Id. at 737-41.
57. See Schapira v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 528 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1987)
(applied law in effect at time trust was created in 1919; held statute which would include
adopted children prospective in application); Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8 (Me. 1985) (applied
law in effect at time of testator's death); Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. 1988)
(applied law in effect at time testator executed will); Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah
1974) (applied law in effect at time trust was created); In re Fortwin Trust, 203 N.W.2d 711
(Wis. 1973) (remanding case with direction to apply law effective at time trust was executed).
58. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma applied the rule in Hines v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 708 P.2d 1078 (Okla. 1985) and included the adopted child in a gift to
issue. In Hines, the executor and other beneficiaries of the will argued that the date of the
adoption (1950) should determine the apllicable law, rather than the date of testator's death
(1967). The adoption law was revised in 1957, and the court permitted the adoptee to partici-
pate in the class gift pursuant to the 1957 statute. Id. at 1079-80. See also Southside Baptist
Church v. Drennen, 362 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 1978) (admitting adopted children into class when
law changed between time of will execution and time of testator's death).
59. See Benz v. Wilmington Trust Co., 333 A.2d 169 (Del. 1975) (affirming presumption
that class of beneficiaries is to be determined by applicable law on date members of the class
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under a class gift, since modem law and policy favor treating adopted
children as natural-born children.'
As one author has argued, a more honest approach would recognize
that most testators probably did not (and still do not) consider whether
or not to include adopted children in their class gifts.6 If a donor wishes
to specifically exclude adopted children from a gift made to issue or de-
scendants, it is a simple matter to insert a specific provision in the will or
trust instrument.62
3. Adult Adoptions
One final concern expressed by the courts in this area is the possibil-
ity that parties may use adoption to defeat the donor's purposes and to
direct property to strangers. A beneficiary under a will or trust may
adopt a neighbor, friend, or lover in order to prevent others from eventu-
ally taking the property. In Cross v. Cross,64 the testator's son was
given a power of appointment to distribute the estate to a descendant of
the testator. The son adopted an adult friend and exercised the power of
appointment in favor of his adopted son. The Illinois court refused to
validate the exercise of the power of appointment, reasoning that this was
contrary not only to the testator's intent, but also to the intent and spirit
of the adoption laws.65 The same result has been reached by the Penn-
sylvania courts. In Estate of Goal,66 one of the beneficiaries of a trust
adopted a forty-one-year-old man in an attempt to ensure his participa-
tion in a remainder gift to the adopting man's children.67 Similarly, in
are to be ascertained); Haskell v. Wilmington Trust Co., 304 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1973) (creating
presumption that law in effect on date beneficiaries are ascertained is applicable law for decid-
ing whether adopted children should be included in class gift); In re Estates of Leggett, 378
N.W.2d 467 (Mich. 1985) (ruling that later-enacted statute overcomes common law presump-
tion against including adopted children in class gifts), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986).
60. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
61. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why,
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 741 (1984).
62. Id.
63. See Halbach, Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L.
REV. 333, 338 (1983); Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 758-59 (1984).
64. 532 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
65. Id. at 488-89. The court also used the traditional intent of the testator rule, reasoning
that this trust showed a clear intent to exclude this particular appointee under the trust, since
the testator knew of her son's long-term residence with the man, and specifically limited possi-
ble appointees to her descendants.
66. 551 A.2d 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
67. Id. at 312. The court declined to enforce the gift since the primary motivation behind
the adoption was to secure the inheritance.
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Estate of Ketcham,6" while the court permitted an individual who was
adopted as a child to participate in a class gift to surviving issue, the
court refused to allow another person who was adopted as an adult to
share in the trust distribution.6 9 In O'Connell v. Riggs National Bank of
Washington D.C. ,70 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to
permit the adopted daughter of a deceased trust beneficiary to receive the
corpus of a trust in preference over other blood relatives of the testator.
The trust beneficiary, childless at the age of seventy-six, had adopted ap-
pellant, who was then age thirty-four. The beneficiary died two months
later.7 In reaching its decision, the court did not focus on the timing of
the adoption, but on the presumed intent of the testator.72
Other courts have permitted an adult adoptee to take under a will or
trust, despite the perception that the adoption was an attempt to divert
property from other heirs. For example, in Evans v. McCoy,7 3 a seventy-
six-year-old woman adopted her twenty-one-year-old neighbor and three
years later also adopted her fifty-three-year-old cousin. The adoptions
were intended to facilitate the sale of some farm land. The Maryland
court permitted the adoptees to take as issue of the adopting parent and
thus defeat the devise of the farmland to other remaindermen.74
Similarly, in In re Estate of Fortney,7 - a Kansas court allowed an
adult adoption to defeat the claims of the remaindermen. In Fortney, a
ninety-year-old life tenant and his wife adopted the wife's sixty-five-year-
old nephew. The nephew received the property as an "[heir] by birth or
adoption" over the objections of other lineal descendants of the
testator. 6
In the unusual case of Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor,7 a Kentucky
appellate court held it was permissible for a husband to adopt his wife
68. 495 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
69. Id. at 597. The court determined the sole purpose of the adoption was to secure the
inheritance.
70. 475 A.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 407.
72. The court found that the testator demonstrated an intent to keep the property in the
family. Evidence of this intent included: specific money bequests to his brothers and sisters; a
cross-remainder to his next of kin if one of his daughters died without issue; a spendthrift
clause in the trust; and the fact that the law in effect at the time of the creation of the trust
would exclude adopted children from taking the remainder. Id. at 408-09.
73. 436 A.2d 436 (Md. 1981).
74. Id. at 441-42. It is interesting to note that the court permitted the adult adoptees to
take as issue even though the will in question became effective in 1899, before the adoption
statute provided for adult adoption in 1937.
75. 611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
76. Id. at 602-03. In Fortney, the other lineal descendants were the nieces and nephews
(or their children and grandchildren) of the original donors.
77. 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
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and make her his legal heir at law. In Bedinger, the donor created a
trust, giving her son a life estate and providing that the corpus would
then be distributed to his heirs at law. The son and his wife had no
children so, after nineteen years of marriage, the husband adopted his
wife.7" The court rejected arguments that this was contrary to the testa-
tor's intent,79 or that the adoption itself violated public policy concerns
about incest or the common law unity of husband and wife.8 °
In Estate ofPittman, t the court allowed adult adoptees to share in a
class gift to children, even though the will had been executed and the
testator had died prior to the recognition of adult adoptions in Califor-
nia. However, the Pittman court required that adult adoptees establish
that they were taken into the adopting home as minors, were reared by
the adopting parents, and were later actually adopted.82 The court thus
created an exception in cases where the adult adoptees were able to estab-
lish a true familial or parent-child relationship prior to the time of the
adoption itself.8 3
Some state adoption statutes limit adult adoptions. For example, a
state may require the adopting parent be a certain number of years older
than the adopted child,8 4 or that the parties be related. 5 Other states
require the parties to have established some sort of parent-child relation-
ship during the adoptee's minority before approving the adoption.86 The
78. Id. at 596.
79. Id. at 597.
80. Id. at 597, 599-600.
81. 163 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
82. Id. at 531.
83. Id.
84. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 227p(a) (West Supp. 1990) (any adult may adopt a younger
adult person); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-222(iv) (Supp. 1988) (statute reqdires the adoptee be at
least fifteen years younger than petitioner and the parties must have known each other for at
least five years and have been residents of the Commonwealth for those five years). Virginia
also permits adult adoptions where the parties established some sort of parent-child relation-
ship before the adoptee reached age eighteen. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-222(i) (Supp. 1989).
For a general discussion of adult adoption, see I. SLOAN, THE LAW OF ADOPTION AND SUR-
ROGATE PARENTING 55-61 (1988).
85. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 1504 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (to adopt an adult, the parties
must be related or have resided together for two years before commencement of adoption); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-222(ii) (Supp. 1989) (may adopt adult niece or nephew with no living par-
ents who has lived in petitioner's home for at least three months).
86. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1501 (1979) (adults may be adopted in cases where adoption
did not occur during adoptee's minority by reason of inadvertence, mistake, or neglect, and the
parties had a parent-child relationship); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(b)(3) (Anderson
1989) (adult adoption permissible if adoptee established parent-child relationship with peti-
tioners during minority).
The Oregon statute specifically addresses the class gift/adult adoption problem by exclud-
ing persons adopted as adults from the statutory presumption that includes adopted children
in class gifts made in wills, deeds, or other instruments. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.195 (1987).
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modem trend, however, is to permit adult adoption by any person."
As one author has noted, the case of adult adoptees is one where the
stranger to the adoption rule may be justified." An adult adoptee should
not be presumed to be a member of a class described in terms of blood
relationships. This need not be an irrebuttable presumption, but one
which can be overcome upon a showing that the parties to the adoption
had a parent-child type of relationship.9 The adult adoption area is one
where traditional concerns about thwarting the likely intent of a class gift
donor are justified.
IV. THE TEXAS LAW
Two Texas appellate courts have recently addressed the question of
whether or not adopted children should be included in class gifts made
under a will or trust. 90 In both cases, the courts' answer to this question
was no.9 ' This article suggests that the better view would include
adopted children in such gifts.
The Texas Supreme Court has not decided any cases directly on this
issue in recent years. In Vaughn v. Vaughn,92 a 1960 case, the court held
that an adopted child was not entitled to benefit from a will provision
that would create a new trust for each child born to the testator's son.9 3
The testator's will created two initial trusts, one for each of the testator's
sons. The trusts were later to be divided into sub-trusts: one for the
testator's sons, one for each of his grandchildren or their descendants,
87. 1. SLOAN, THE LAW OF ADOPTION AND SURROGATE PARENTING 55-56 (1988). See
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-16(a) (1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.51 (1986).
In some states, court decisions may modify the statutory language. For example, the New
York statute is general in nature, and would seem to permit any adult adoption. N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988). In In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424
(N.Y. 1984), a 57 year-old man sought to adopt a 50 year-old man. The parties had lived
together for twenty-five years and sought the adoption for a variety of reasons, but did not
have a parent-child relationship. The court held that adoption may not be used as a vehicle to
legitimize a sexual relationship, be it homosexual or heterosexual. Id. at 425. This area is
another, totally separate problem involved with adult adoption.
88. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why,
37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 809 (1984).
89. Id.
90. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ); Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
91. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
no writ) (unambiguous intent to exclude adopted child); Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160,
162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (intended to exclude adopted
children).
92. 161 Tex. 104, 337 S.W.2d 793 (1960).
93. Id. at 110, 337 S.W.2d at 797.
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and one for each grandchild born after the testator's death. The testator
died in 1955. A child was born in 1956 and adopted that same year by
one of the sons.94 The court held the adopted child could not require the
trustees to establish a new trust for his benefit. The court relied on the
use of the term "born," holding that it limited trust participation to natu-
ral-born children.9" The court also relied on extrinsic evidence: the tes-
tator had created two inter vivos trusts, in 1946 and 1951, both of which
made specific provision for adopted children.9 6
In Cutrer v. Cutrer,97 decided in 1961, the Texas Supreme Court
applied the stranger to the adoption rule to hold that an adopted child
was excluded from taking under trust gifts to children and heirs of the
body.98 However, the court in Cutrer relied on an older probate stat-
ute,99 in effect at the time of the donor's death, rather than the statute
applicable at the time the class gift vested."°
Although both Vaughn and Cutrer seem to indicate that Texas
courts will continue to follow the traditional adoption rules, it is impor-
tant to remember that both cases were decided more than twenty-five
years ago. The repudiation of the stranger to the adoption rule did not
begin in earnest in American law until the late 1960s and early 1970s. 10'
Another consideration is the 1984 Texas Supreme Court decision in Leh-
man v. Corpus Christi National Bank.' °2 In Lehman, the testator's will
specifically included adopted persons in the definition of descendants.
The court held that the will unambiguously included a person who had
94. Id. at 106-07, 337 S.W.2d at 793-94.
95. Id. at 110, 337 S.W.2d at 792.
96. Id.
97. 162 Tex. 166, 345 S.W.2d 513 (1961).
98. See id. at 172, 345 S.W.2d at 517. The court stated that the term issue clearly con-
notes a blood relationship, and the phrase heirs of the body was also limited to lineal blood
relatives. The court indicated that, in a traditional sense, a child is a descendant of the first
degree. Further, the trusts in question used the terms children and issue interchangeably.
99. Adoption of Minor Children Act, ch. 177, § 9, 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws 300, 302, re-
pealed by Family Code Act, ch. 543, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1458. The statute provided
that an adopted child should be "deemed and held to be, for every purpose, the child of its
parent or parents by adoption as fully as though born of them in lawful wedlock."
The court also relied on its prior decision in Hoch v. Hoch, 140 Tex. 475, 168 S.W.2d 638
(1943), which limited the application of the 1931 statute to the parties to the adoption.
100. Cutrer v. Cutrer, 162 Tex. 166, 174, 345 S.W.2d 513, 518-19 (1961). See supra notes
55-62 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 39. Even in Cutrer, two justices dissented, arguing that the statute in
effect at the time the remainder vested, rather than the statute in effect at the time of donor's
death, should be controlling; that heirs of the body should be construed to mean children and
that children includes adopted children; and that modern public policy favored the treatment
of an adopted child as if he were a natural-born child. Cutrer v. Cutrer, 162 Tex. 166, 176, 345
S.W.2d 513, 520 (1961) (Griffin & Hamilton, JJ., dissenting).
102. 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1984).
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been adopted as an adult. 3 The language of the will made that decision
a relatively simple one for the court. In addition, the court went on to
indicate that Texas has specifically rejected the stranger to the adoption
rule."o The court further stated that the rule was contrary to the public
policy of the state of Texas.105 However, it is unclear whether the two
recent Texas appellate court decisions follow the principles set forth in
Lehman.
The first case, Diemer v. Diemer,0 6 involved the construction of a
will provision affecting the issue of the testator's children. B.P. Diemer,
the testator, died in 1959. His will, executed in 1956, conveyed life es-
tates in various parcels of land to Thyra and Elizabeth, the testator's
daughters, and to Upton, the testator's son, with remainder interests to
their descendants. Another paragraph conveyed a life estate to Ted, an-
other son, and his descendants. However, if Ted were to die without
issue then a contingent remainder was conveyed to the issue of Thyra,
Elizabeth, and Upton."0 7
Ted was married twice. His first wife, with whom he had no chil-
dren, died in 1962. Ted remarried in 1964; his second wife had a child
from a previous marriage. Ted formally adopted his wife's son, James
Scott, in 1968, when James was twenty-three years old. 10 8 The testator's
other children all had natural-born children at the time of testator's
death in 1959.109
The problem in Diemer was whether or not James Scott should be
permitted to take as the remainderman after Ted's life estate terminated.
The court held that James could not inherit under the terms of the
will.' ° First, the court recited the premise that wills should be con-
strued in accord with the intent of the testator. That intent should be
determined from the will instrument itself, if possible."' Analyzing the
103. Id. at 688.
104. Id. (citing Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), aff'd, 461
S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1970)). In Vaughn, an adopted child was permitted to participate in a class
gift made to children. The court relied on changes in Texas statutory adoption law, changes in
public policy regarding adoption, and the fact that no intention to exclude adopted children
could be found in the trusts. Id. at 526.
105. Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank, 668 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. 1984).
106. 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. Id. at 161.
108. Id. at 163.
109. Id. at 162.
110. Id.
111. Id. See also Gee v. Read, 606 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1980) (primary object of construing
will is to determine intent of testator; intent should be determined from language in docu-
ment); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. 1977) (in unambiguous will,
intent must be ascertained from four comers of document).
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language of the document, the court reasoned the testator must have had
a reason for using the term "descendants" in several paragraphs of the
will, then changing to the term "issue" in another section. 112 The word
"issue" was given its traditional meaning, connoting a blood relation-
ship.113 Secondly, although not explicitly indicating it was doing so, the
court clearly considered extrinsic evidence in attempting to ascertain the
testator's intent. The fact that at the time of the will's execution Ted was
the testator's only child with no natural offspring was used to explain the
intentional use of the word "issue" in his bequest.
14
In another portion of the opinion, the court held that James could
participate in a bequest to Ted's children. This conveyance was made
under the will of Dora Diemer, who was B.P.'s wife and Ted's mother.
Her will, however, specifically indicated that the terms children or child
would include legally adopted children." 5 The court found that the tes-
tatrix's intent to include adopted children was clear, and that the testa-
trix did not intend to exclude a person who was adopted as an adult, such
as James Scott.116
In Sharp v. Broadway National Bank,' the San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that adopted children could not take as lineal descendants
under a testamentary trust.'" In Sharp, John Yates, the testator, died in
1964. His will had been executed in 1953. The will created a trust to
benefit the testator's whole-blooded sisters and brothers and their de-
scendants. At the time of the testator's death, one of his whole-blooded
brothers had predeceased him, leaving four children: L.S. Yates,
Mayana Sharp, Estelle Holmes, and Allison Yates. Both L.S. Yates and
Mayana Sharp had adopted children. When L.S. Yates and Mayana
Sharp died, the trustee refused to disburse trust income to the adoptees
112. Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
113. Id. The court cited White v. Taylor, 155 Tex. 392, 286 S.W.2d 925 (1956), for the
proposition that words used in a will should be given their ordinary and usual meaning. The
court then cited Cutrer for the proposition that the term issue clearly connotes a blood rela-
tionship. However, the Cutrer court also considered adoptees to be excluded from a gift to the
class of children, which is clearly contrary to modem law and policy. In modern usage, issue
may be considered the equivalent of children.
114. Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). "All of the children, with the exception of Ted Diemer, had natural chil-
dren.... The only time B.P. Diemer used the term 'issue' was in his bequest to Ted Diemer,
his only child without natural children."
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id. But see Foster v. Foster, 641 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ)
(court indicates that Texas law does not generally give adopted adult same inheritance rights
as adopted minor child).
117. 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
118. Id. at 143-44.
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and sought a declaratory judgment that they were excluded from partici-
pation in the trust under the provisions of the will. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee. 19
The appellate court attempted to ascertain the intent of the testator
from the language in the will. The testator had included a statement of
intent, indicating he wished the greatest benefit under the will to go to his
relatives of the whole blood, not to strangers, or relatives of the half-
blood.' 20 The will then established a testamentary trust, and provided
that the trust income should be distributed to the testator's brothers, sis-
ters, nieces, nephews, and their lineal descendants. The court found that
by reference to strangers in the will, the testator intended to exclude per-
sons who were not blood relatives; since adopted children are not related
by blood, they would be excluded. 2' Further, the court held that the
statement of intent, expressing a preference for blood relatives, modified
and defined the term lineal descendants to include only relatives of the
whole blood.' 22
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, without actually using the term, these recent cases
position Texas among the minority of jurisdictions still clinging to the
outmoded stranger to the adoption rule. In neither case did the court
assume that adopted children should participate in the class gift, but in-
stead focused on the presumed intent of the testator.123 Without a clear
declaration of intent, however, it is difficult to determine the testator's
true intent from the will document itself. The court will almost of neces-
sity start with a certain presumption, or favor a particular outcome
119. Id. at 143.
120. The statement of intent indicated:
It is my primary purpose will, desire and intention to dispose of all my property in a
fair, honest, just and normal manner so that MY RELATIVES OF THE WHOLE
BLOOD AND/OR THEIR ISSUE SHALL RECEIVE THE GREATEST BENE-
FIT THEREFROM AND NOT any STRANGERS, OR RELATIVES OF THE
HALF BLOOD, OR THEIR ISSUE....
Id. at 143.
121. Id. at 145. The court cited Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161 Tex. 104, 337 S.W.2d 793 (1960)
for the proposition that adopted children are "children born to strangers," and should be
excluded from the gift in this case.
122. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
no writ).
123. Id. at 144. The court found that will construction involved a question of the testa-
tor's intent, not a question of the right to inherit. Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160, 162
(Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (intent from will, not will from
intent). In Sharp, the court did point out that adopted children were presumed by statute to be
included in class gifts, but then demoted the presumption to "no[thing] more than an aid to be
employed in the construction of the will, and is not controlling." 761 S.W.2d at 144.
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through its choice of construction maxims and its interpretation of the
will terms. In both Sharp and Diemer, the courts construed arguably
unclear terms in such a way as to exclude adopted children. Although
both courts believed they had determined the testator's actual intent, it is
this author's view that both cases were wrongly decided.
Like many states, Texas has enacted statutory provisions indicating
that adopted children should be treated as natural-born children. The
Texas Probate Code provision to this effect was enacted in 1955, and it
states that adopted children may inherit by and through their parents
and their parents' kin.' 24 The Probate Code also specifically includes
adopted children under the definition of child.' 25 The Texas Family
Code echoes this provision and further states that the terms child, de-
scendant and issue, and similar terms presumptively include adopted
children unless the context or express language of the document indicates
otherwise.' 26 Although testators may make any conveyances they wish,
and exclude any person they wish, it appears to be the public policy of
this state to start with a presumption in favor of inclusion of adopted
children in testamentary class gifts.
The decision in Diemer '27 hinged on the meaning of the word issue
and the use of extrinsic facts to ascertain the testator's likely intent re-
garding his son's adopted child. The court chose to construe the term
issue in its traditional sense, connoting a blood relationship. 128 Many
courts are moving away from this interpretation of issue and are instead
construing it to be the equivalent of children or descendants. 129 This
interpretation is certainly more in line with the modern view of the fam-
ily as a social, psychological unit, rather than simply a biological group.
There is really no reason to assume that the testator in Diemer meant to
distinguish descendants from issue in his will. The choice of the term
"issue" could merely refer to children; if the beneficiary never had chil-
dren, he was not likely to have descendants either.
124. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 1980).
For purposes of inheritance under the laws of descent and distribution, an adopted
child shall be regarded as the child of the parent or parents by adoption, such
adopted child and its descendants inheriting from and through the parent or parents
by adoption and their kin the same as if such child were the natural legitimate child
of such parent or parents by adoption ....
125. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b) (Vernon 1980).
126. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.09(c) (Vernon 1986).
127. Diemer v. Diemer, 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
128. Id. at 162.
129. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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In Sharp,130 the court used a statement of intent contained in the
testator's will to interpret the words lineal descendants. Since the testa-
tor indicated that he wanted to benefit relatives of the whole blood, the
court found that adopted children were excluded.13 However, it is pos-
sible that the testator's primary concern was with his half-brother, or
with those persons who were related only by marriage, and that it was
those persons that he meant to exclude in his will. Admittedly, Sharp
presents a stronger case against the adoptees than Diemer, yet in both
cases it would have been easy enough for the testator to exclude adopted
children from participation under a will by a simple and straightforward
directive. In light of modern case law, policy, and statutes, it is prefera-
ble to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the adoptees.
130. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ).
131. Id. at 145.
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